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Essay 
Joseph Story’s Republics in a Minor Key:                
Dark Times and the Astonishing Relevance of Kent 
Newmyer 
STEVEN R. WILF 
Kent Newmyer’s biography of Justice Joseph Story set the standard of later 
judicial biographies. Yet it focused on the public aspects of republicanism in 
Story’s court decisions rather than the ways a republican ethos might lead to the 
construction of alternative realms. Such realms became increasingly important as 
the common republicanism of the founding generation waned. In response to 
Jeffersonian and, especially, Jacksonian partisan politics, Story began to carve 
out space to invent domains apart from the politicized spheres of Supreme Court 
decision-making. It was Story’s adaptation to what he considered dark times. This 
Article examines three of these parallel worlds—his construction of a saltwater 
jurisprudence through admiralty law that proved a separate realm from the 
Court’s common law cases, his lengthy poetic imagining of a solitary place apart 
from politics, and his encouragement of mechanic republicanism through patent 
law and his involvement with mechanical institutes. Dark times elicit the making of 
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Joseph Story’s Republics in a Minor Key:              
Dark Times and the Astonishing Relevance of Kent 
Newmyer 
STEVEN R. WILF * 
In den finsteren Zeiten                                    In the dark times 
Wird da auch gesungen werden?                   Will there also be singing? 
Da wird auch gesungen werden.                    Yes, there will also be singing. 
Von den finsteren Zeiten.                                About the dark times. 
 
Bertolt Brecht 
Svendborg Poems, 19391 
 
[E]ven in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some 
illumination, and that such illumination may well come less from theories 
and concepts than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that 
some men and women, in their lives and their works, will kindle under 
almost all circumstances and shed over the time span that was given them 
on earth . . . . 
 
Hannah Arendt 
Men in Dark Times2 
 




                                                                                                                     
* Steven Wilf is the Anthony J. Smits Professor of Global Commerce at the Law School of the 
University of Connecticut.  Many thanks to Peter Siegelman, Alexandra Lahav, Jed Shugerman, Mary 
Bilder, and the late Hugh Macgill.  Richard Ross, Simon Stern, and Christopher Tomlins will recognize 
fragments of past conversations. My special appreciation to Kent Newmyer, whose lifetime of 
scholarship provides so much to celebrate. 
1 Bertholt Brecht, Svendborg Poems (1939), reprinted in David Constantine, The Usefulness of 
Poetry, in BRECHT’S POETRY OF POLITICAL EXILE 29, 39 (Ronald Speirs ed., 2000). 
2 HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES, at ix (1955). 
3 LEONARD COHEN, Anthem, on THE FUTURE (Columbia Records 1992).  
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 INTRODUCTION  
Kent probably never expected to be relevant. He is a scholar’s 
scholar—careful in his research and following paths directed by the 
historical documents themselves. His paragraphs are filled with footnotes 
arrayed in neat formation to make a point—much like a Roman legion’s 
phalanx. But many of us have come to believe that we are living in a 
neo-Jacksonian age—the appeal to mass democracy at a rather base level; 
the exuberant embrace of markets; the cultural construction of citizenship 
privileging the white, male, and able; the raw plasticity of truth; and the 
crossing of established civil society norms. For those of us committed to 
the rule of law (and who isn’t in a law faculty?), we find ourselves in a 
situation akin to Justice Joseph Story who, in the early nineteenth century, 
defended legal norms against the Jeffersonians and—to an even larger 
extent—against the Jacksonians. 
This is the trajectory of much of Kent’s life work—to interrogate the 
tension between law and popular politics from Jefferson to Jackson, from 
Marshall to Taney. What does rule of law mean in an age of disruption? 
I recall suggesting a different title for this symposium in honor of Kent 
that referred to “law in dark times.” Wiser counsel, perhaps, prevailed to 
soften this to “our times.” But I am going to take the risk of slipping into 
potentially political brackish waters (much to my discomfort) and think 
about Kent’s Story from the vantage point of our own dark times.4 I am 
following French historian Pierre Nora’s dictum: We must prevent history 
from being merely history.5 
What I will not do is resurface Story’s Jeremiad. We all know that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Charles River Bridge (1837)6 marked a 
turning point. A corporate charter granted by Massachusetts was 
abrogated, and a new, competing bridge was built nearby. For Jacksonians 
like Justice Roger Taney, the opinion’s author, it freed a dynamic market 
economy from the fetters of legal norms favoring old elites. This market 
revolution, as Charles Sellers has called it,7 was a comeuppance for those 
who favored traditional notions of rule of law. The legalist republicanism 
of the founders was upset by the mass democracy of the Jacksonians.  
                                                                                                                     
4 See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD 
REPUBLIC, at xvi (1985) [hereinafter NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE] (setting forth Story’s 
nationalist vision, which took place “squarely on the fault line of historical change”).   
5 Pierre Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire, 26 REPRESENTATIONS 7, 18 
(1989).  
6 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837). 
7 CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA 1815–1846, at 21 
(1991) (“The American economy’s takeoff was fueled by the unusually feverish enterprise of its market 
sector. Colonial Americans pursued wealth more freely than Europeans because they were not 
overshadowed and hemmed in by aristocrats and postfeudal institutions.”). 
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Story considered resigning from the Court after Charles River Bridge. 
He believed (as he recorded in his notes) that this decision was simply the 
exercise of “sheer power.”8 Writing to Joseph Story, Chancellor Kent 
complained that the Supreme Court “has fallen from its high station and 
commanding dignity, and has lost its energy and spirit, and independence 
and accuracy, and surrendered up to the tempter of the day the true 
principles of the constitution.”9 In the wake of Charles River Bridge, a 
despondent Story famously wrote: “I am the last of the old race of judges. I 
stand their solitary representative, with a pained heart and a subdued 
confidence.”10 By the 1830s, the American Justinians, Kent and Story, (to 
use Sellers’s phrase) became the American Jeremiahs. 
Story is today mostly known for his Jeremiad. Jeremiads have a long 
history in American letters—as Sacvan Bercovitch famously has shown—
from Jonathan Edwards onwards. They reflect the chasm between the ideal 
and the actual.11 It is not surprising that Story’s dissent in Charles River 
Bridge embraced this particularly New England Old Testament tradition 
when he wrote: “I stand upon the old law.”12 
But I want to tell a different Story: how he created over his lifetime—
and not just in response to the Jacksonian assault on contract—a number of 
independent worlds that embodied his ideal of legalism. They form a kind 
of archipelago of republicanism, an assemblage of islands sharing a 
common cultural ecosystem with similar political ideas. Derived from the 
Latin res publica, republicanism was an ideological posture as much as a 
firm set of ascribed political positions. It presumed a public-directed 
governance grounded in citizens with shared values. Yet what happens 
when the values are no longer shared? When citizens establish political 
parties at odds with each other—even barely speaking the same language? 
And when the public good becomes a point of contestation as much as 
agreement? Story remained a republican for his entire lifetime. Yet he had 
to reinvent what republicanism meant by creating space beyond the reality 
of contemporary politics. For lack of a better term, I will call these worlds 
an example of republics in a minor key. And, I will argue, it is precisely 
that kind of republicanism we need as we grope our way through our own 
dark times. 
                                                                                                                     
8 Kent Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story, The Charles River Bridge Case and the Crisis of 
Republicanism, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 232, 234 (1973). 
9 JOHN THEODORE HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM 1763-1847, at 293–94 
(1939). 
10 JOHN M. SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 400 (1879). 
11 See SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD, at xv (1978) (introducing the epilogue’s 
focus on American literary texts’ “pervasive impact upon [the] culture of the American jeremiad”).  
12 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 598 (1837) 
(Story, J., dissenting).   
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German poet Bertholt Brecht, who certainly lived in dark times, 
penned a few lines that encompass the kind of creativity that can emerge at 
moments when fundamental principles seem to be in eclipse: 
In the dark times 
Will there also be singing? 
Yes, there will be singing                                       
About the dark times.13 
This talk will be about how Story took the ideal of republicanism and 
embodied it in a variety of different independent normative worlds 
(republicanism in a minor key). These were Story’s songs for a dark time. I 
prefer this approach as opposed to the politics of resentment, the 
commonplace of Story in dissent penning a Jeremiad, and the predictions 
(from Henry Adams to David Brooks) of American decay. These are 
simply rhetorical responses. Making space apart from hegemonic common 
law legalism is a fundamentally pragmatic lawyerly approach.  
My point of departure is Kent’s trenchant discussion of republicanism 
in the Story biography. Kent situates Story in republican culture. 
Republicanism is (and I quote Kent) “a set of collectively held and often 
vaguely defined general assumptions about American government and 
society: what it was as well as what it ought to be.”14 But there was a shift 
in this culture. In the 1780s, Americans were acutely aware of the problem 
of how difficult it is to sustain a republic when the historical deck is 
stacked against you. The past is replete with classical republics and 
renaissance republics that failed. Historians have long recognized that this 
sense of frailty was grounded in an eighteenth-century trope about virtue 
eroded through corruption. 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, Americans 
celebrated a republic that had survived for decades. But the essence of the 
republic—a small political unit sharing common cultural values—seems to 
have eroded even as the American polity was enlarged. Frontiersmen and 
sophisticated merchants in seaport cities, agrarian yeomen and urban 
mechanics with leather aprons, slave owners and Northern 
manufacturers—what did they have in common? Agrarian republicanism 
tussled with commercial republicanism. And by the 1830s, Taney’s 
Supreme Court had become a tribunal divided against itself.   
Yet Story, I will argue, developed three different independent 
worlds—his archipelago of republicanism in a minor key—where he 
established norms of his own: the first is the saltwater expanse of 
Admiralty law, the second his own personal retreat in a poetic incarnation 
                                                                                                                     
13 Brecht, supra note 1, at 39. 
14 NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at xv. 
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of solitude, and the third is the making of a modern patent law situated in a 
milieu of artisans and mechanics. 
Let me begin with the sea. 
I. FIRST SONG: SALTWATER JURISDICTION 
Admiralty law articulated a particular vision of an expansive republic. 
Instead of the expansion—really the colonial enterprise of the United 
States—stretching westward across the continent as Jacksonians endorsed, 
Story promoted a seaward projecting of American power through its 
merchant fleets under the flag of federal jurisdiction.   
The commonplace understanding of Admiralty courts is as the tribunal 
for adjudicating private maritime disputes. During the period of the Early 
Republic, however, admiralty law was more akin to public law. The 
Constitution’s Admiralty Clause15 was intended to assert federal 
jurisdiction over prize cases, which had a diplomatic dimension; addressed 
crimes taking place on the high seas, often by pirates who were (like 
today’s terrorists) the non-state actors of the period; and enabled the 
policing of tariffs, which implicated a major source of revenue for the 
federal government.16 
Citizens of the Early Republic had every reason to detest admiralty 
law. It was deployed by the British to evade colonial juries. In 1764, the 
English Revenue Act established a Vice-Admiralty Court in Halifax that 
tried Americans who resisted imposed tariffs. Colonial Americans, who 
celebrated their jury system as an emblem of liberty, found themselves 
hauled before a court without a jury trial, the burden of proof rested upon 
those whose ships were seized—often on thin evidence—by customs 
officers, and the tribunal itself benefitted from the selling of a condemned 
vessel. Locating the proceedings in Halifax meant merchants had to 
contend in proceedings thousands of miles from their homes. Even after 
1768, when the Vice-Admiralty Court was moved to Boston, Charleston, 
and Philadelphia, these legal actions served imperial interests and violated 
basic common law norms.17 
Yet, more than anyone else in the Early Republic, Story championed 
Admiralty jurisdiction. In the 1815 landmark case DeLovio v. Boit, Story 
determined that a contract of maritime insurance, no matter where 
executed, was subject to admiralty jurisdiction.18 After meticulously listing 
                                                                                                                     
15 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
16 William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, 
Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 118 (1993). 
17 Richard Ross & Steven Wilf, Revolutionary Mobilization and 18th Century Legal Orders—
Learned, Vernacular, and Comparative, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(Marjoleine Kars, Michael A. McDonnell, & Andrew M. Schocket eds., forthcoming 2022).   
18 DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). 
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much narrower English precedent, Story—gesturing to the time 
immemorial nature of admiralty law—decided that the United States has a 
different, vastly expanded maritime jurisdiction grounded in the 
Constitution’s Admiralty Clause.19 In fact, the Constitution does nothing 
more than state “the judicial power shall extend . . . to all cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”20 The devil, of course, is in the 
details defining the deep blue sea. 
It is only after reading Story’s lengthy historical chronicle in DeLovio 
that it becomes clear that this decision was truly radical.21 Sir Edward Coke 
in the seventeenth century vindicated broad common law jurisdiction by 
shrinking courts founded on royal prerogatives—including Admiralty.22 A 
good case could be made that the use of a Savings Clause—saving those 
seeking redress from common law remedies in court—embodied Coke’s 
principle of limiting other forms of adjudication. Coke is the villain in 
what G. Edward White has called Story’s “historical morality play.”23 
Story rejected the common law bounds of admiralty and campaigned for 
his claim that the American Revolution turned upside down English law 
because “[t]he advantages . . . to the commerce and navigation of the 
United States, from a uniformity of rules and decisions in all maritime 
questions, authorize us to believe that national policy, as well as juridical 
logic, require the clause of the [C]onstitution to be so [expansively] 
construed . . . .”24 
Plank by plank, Story built admiralty jurisdiction as a different world. 
After a good deal of controversy, the Supreme Court in 1813 determined in 
United States v. Hudson and Goodwin that there was no common law of 
federal crimes.25 Yet the very same year in United States v. Coolidge, Story 
found that felonies committed on the high seas, even in the absence of any 
statutory basis whatsoever, might be punishable by United States courts.26 
Historians generally point to Story’s childhood in Marblehead and local 
connections to explain his remarkable commitment to admiralty law.   
Story’s maritime turn might be better understood in the shadow of the 
War of 1812—a historical moment that has received insufficient attention 
from legal historians. In the course of the war, Story’s circuit caseload was 
inundated with prize cases. Indeed, quite apart from Story’s own 
                                                                                                                     
19 Id. at 441; U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
20 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
21 DeLovio, 7 F. Cas. at 419–26. 
22 Id. at 421. 
23 G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835, in III–IV THE OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 438 (Paul A. 
Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988). 
24 DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 443 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). 
25 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 32 (1812). 
26 United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 621 (D. Mass. 1813). 
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maneuvers to expand admiralty jurisdiction, simply through the naval 
conflict a remarkable one-third of the Supreme Court docket involved 
admiralty law.27 In the war’s wake, the Federalist party collapses, regional 
divides are sharpened as the North becomes more industrial, the South 
increasingly relies upon monoculture grounded in unfree labor. Finally, the 
transportation revolution—railroads and canals—turn out to be a locus of 
contention even while intended to bind an increasingly fractured nation 
together.   
Alan Taylor has described the War of 1812 as a North American civil 
war that pitted American citizens against Canadian subjects.28 Yet it also 
was a pivotal point for the fracturing of shared American values as distinct 
regional identities emerged from the war with different agendas. New 
England, in particular, saw itself increasingly politically isolated as it 
sought to protect its seafaring industries. The British acts of impressment 
and flogging of American sailors were not simply a casus belli. By 
presenting the amplification of maritime law as a national project, Story 
was seeking a touchstone for commonality in an increasingly splintered 
America. His cases were nothing short of a saltwater manifesto for 
American sovereignty.29 The War of 1812, however, was more than a 
second war of independence from the British. It was also a formative step 
towards the sectional conflict that would culminate in the Civil War.   
Federal admiralty law was intended to supplant state court power. 
Story sought to fashion a maritime science of law—deeply founded on 
doctrinal principles and controlled by judges rather than compromised by 
legislative interference and fickle juries. Through using the particularly 
enhanced authority of common law judges, he hoped to import the 
discipline of civil law norms. As he stated in an 1829 address to members 
of the bar, “our jurisprudence is young and flexible,” and maritime law was 
the perfect place to lodge legal transplants.30 Admiralty jurisdiction 
extended far and wide, claiming in personam and in rem jurisdiction over 
maritime contracts, insurance, and liens even when these were executed on 
land. Until he reversed course in The Thomas Jefferson (1825),31 it looked 
as if Story would extend admiralty jurisdiction well beyond the ebb and 
flow of the tides—and through the vast array of inland waterways no 
                                                                                                                     
27 Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall 
Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1315 (1985). 
28 ALAN TAYLOR, THE CIVIL WAR OF 1812: AMERICAN CITIZENS, BRITISH SUBJECTS, IRISH 
REBELS, AND INDIAN ALLIES 6–12 (2010). 
29 R. Kent Newmyer, Joseph Story and the War of 1812: A Judicial Nationalist, 26 HISTORIAN 
486, 487 (1964). 
30 Joseph Story, Supreme Court Justice, An Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk 
Bar, at their Anniversary, on the Fourth of September, 1821, at Boston (Sept. 4, 1821), in 1 AM. JURIST 
& L. MAG. 1, 29 (1829). 
31 The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. 428 (1825).  
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matter how insignificant. His Fabian retreat in The Thomas Jefferson (how 
ironic that the vessel was named after his nemesis) was an attempt to keep 
his salt water world intact even as others questioned the right of a New 
England built admiralty law to assert its claims over steamboats making 
their way down broad rivers such as the Missouri.   
Even when Story yielded ground in his campaign for vast admiralty 
jurisdiction, such an abandoning of the field was simply tactical. In the 
very same year as The Thomas Jefferson, Story, in partnership with Daniel 
Webster, drafted what would become the Crimes Act of 1825. It included a 
brash imagining of topography. A federal crime on the high seas includes 
“any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction of the United States.”32 Any creek? And in 1845, the year of 
his death, Story drafted the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, which extended 
federal admiralty jurisdiction to the Great Lakes and its connecting 
waterways.33 This piece of legislation was a gesture of penance for his 
decision in The Thomas Jefferson.   
“It was said of . . . Story, that if a bucket of water were brought into his 
court with a corn cob floating in it, he would at once extend the admiralty 
jurisdiction of the United States over it.”34 The saltwater republic had 
expanded (yet again) into freshwater domains. 
II. SECOND SONG: SOLITUDE AS REFUGE 
No one has a good word to say about Story as a poet. His poem, The 
Power of Solitude, Kent writes, “fell into well-deserved obscurity, except 
the single copy that for some mysterious reason remained chained to a 
table at Harvard Law School.”35 Legal historian Sandra VanBurkleo calls 
him a “second-rate poet.”36 Story himself knew that he was better off 
penning his nine treatises covering such diverse subjects as bailments and 
civil pleadings. These constituted what Story envisioned as legal science. 
Treatises summoned up the illusion of a coherent and unified 
Anglo-American common law. They stood between the bric-a-brac of 
Anglo-American case law and the overly determined codes of Continental 
Europe. Treatises were part of a nation building enterprise—an attempt to 
                                                                                                                     
32 An Act More Effectually to Provide for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United 
States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 65, 4 Stat. 115, 115–117, 122 (1825). 
33 An Act Extending the Jurisdiction of the District Courts to Certain Cases, Upon the Lakes and 
Navigable Waters Connecting the Same, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726, 726 (1845).  
34 Note, Extension of Federal Jurisdiction Over State Canals, 37 AM. L. REV. 911, 916 (1903).  
35 NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 52. 
36 Sandra F. VanBurkleo, Book Review: Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the 
Old Republic by R. Kent Newmyer, U. MINN. L. SCH. CONST. COMMENT., 244, 245 (1986). 
 
2021] JOSEPH STORY’S REPUBLICS IN A MINOR KEY 1291 
fashion a national law much as Noah Webster identified an American 
language.37 
Yet when Story became Dane Professor at Harvard in 1829, his 
inaugural lecture urged students to study literature in order to uncover the 
“graphical displays of the human heart.”38 The Power of Solitude39 is 
perhaps too much of a display. It stretches to 260 pages—let me repeat, 
260 pages—and is filled with images from Piranesian ruins to solitary 
groves to (I quote) “mouldered turret and . . . moonlight.”40  
What prompted Story to write in 1804 such a lengthy, singularly 
non-epic poem? Joel Barlow, just three years later in 1807, published a 
vast national epic, The Columbiad, about how America established a 
republic founded on Godwinian notions of justice.41 Just as the Aeneid tells 
tale of a hero’s journey from Troy to the Italian Peninsula, and links this 
account to Rome’s legendary founding, Barlow hoped to trace the 
beginnings of “rational liberty” in the New World. By contrast, Story’s 
poem is personal, not about politics. It is what Montaigne called an 
arrière-boutique—the psychological space to have a back shop behind a 
very public life. If his treatises are an exercise in Enlightenment thinking, 
then his poem reflects his youthful infatuation with Rousseau and German 
romanticism.42    
The Power of Solitude is dominated by light, landscape, and love. It 
was published the same year that Story’s first wife, Mary, died at age 
twenty-three.43 The light is generally muted and gloomy, the landscape 
filled with Piranesian ruins—overgrown retreats, groves filled with the 
“magic arts.”44 The landscape is what Story calls “an irregular fabric.”45 
And love? It was mostly longing. The Poet Petrarch, lovesick, speaks with 
Laura who seeks refuge in the verdant stream of the Vaucluse: refrigerio 
de’ sospir miei lassi (“comfort for [my] weary sighs”). 
                                                                                                                     
37 Steven Wilf, Legal Treatise, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND THE HUMANITIES 687–702 
(Simon Stern, Maksymillian Del Mar & Bernadette Meyler eds., 2020). 
38 JOSEPH STORY, Value and Importance of Legal Studies: A Discourse Pronounced at the 
Inauguration of the Author as Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University, August 25, 1829, in THE 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 503, 527–29 (William W. Story ed., 1857). 
39 JOSEPH STORY, THE POWER OF SOLITUDE (1804). 
40 Id. at 14. 
41 See A New Work of Taste: The Power of Solitude, SALEM REG., May 30, 1805, at 2 
(announcing publication of The Power of Solitude). See also STEVEN WILF, LAW’S IMAGINED 
REPUBLIC: POPULAR POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 161–63 (2010) 
(discussing Joel Barlow’s praise of the Guillotine). On Joel Barlow, more generally, see RICHARD 
BUEL, JR., JOEL BARLOW: AMERICAN CITIZEN IN A REVOLUTIONARY WORLD (2011). 
42 See NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 40 (noting that at this time Joseph 
Story was “singing the beauties of Rousseau, Southey, Junius, and the German Romantics”). 
43 Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story, The Germinal Years, 75 HARV. L. REV. 707, 716 (1962); 
Married, Died, SALEM GAZETTE, June 25, 1805, at 2 (announcing the death of Mary Story at age 23). 
44 STORY, THE POWER OF SOLITUDE, supra note 39, at 13.  
45 Id. at 1. 
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The Power of Solitude was deeply personal—but it was written in the 
shadow of less than solitary party politics. Story, an ever-so-conservative 
Republican, was witnessing the ascendancy of Jeffersonian politics of the 
sort that he found distasteful. After Story opposed the embargo on British 
shipping, Jefferson suspected he was a Federalist in Republican waistcoat. 
The poem’s central theme focuses on the pleasures of solitude.46 It 
describes the struggle with association, the tranquility of retired life, and 
the quiet cultivation of the more refined parts of the soul.47 Story urges the 
reader to reject honors and fame. Following a trope of Renaissance 
political thought, it commends the love of “classic ruins” and the retreats 
of departed ius.48 Ius, of course, is law—both in its abstract sense and in 
the meaning of a place where justice is meted out. Nowhere else is Story so 
personal. Law will be replaced by loneliness, the vita activa with the vita 
contemplativa (the active life with the contemplative life). 
1805 was Story’s pivotal year.49 He fashioned what the French call an 
interior labyrinth (labyrinthe intérieur), an imagined memory palace where 
one can withdraw in seclusion from personal and political loss. Kent’s 
biography describes Story as part of a generation “obsessed with the 
question of ambition, greatness, fame—all rooted in the history and logic 
of a successful revolution.”50 The biography is explicitly, and almost 
exclusively, concerned with Story’s judicial persona. As Kent wrote in his 
introduction, “Story largely subsumed his private life” in his public 
calling.51 And he worked on this presumption, keeping close to the 
biographic plotline of Story as a judicial statesman. It is true that Story 
“needed the company of friends.”52 However, he might best be described 
as a convivial loner. In 1805, solitude was his solace. As Story wrote to a 
classmate: “My spirits have been so depressed, and my anguish so keen, 
that for three months I have been solitary and closeted, unknowing and 
unknown in the world.”53 
There is a real question of how Story could have operated in his own 
dark times of endangered republicanism without the security of his inner 
sanctuary. As Kevin Butterfield has recently pointed out in a masterful 
book, the penchant for membership and association was core to America in 
                                                                                                                     
46 See id. at 10 (discussing a “lone enthusiast” enjoying the solitary study of “elder lore”). 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Dunne, supra note 43, at 718. His father, Elisha Story, died the same year.  
50 NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 30. 
51 Id. at xiv. 
52 Id. at 53. 
53 Letter from Joseph Story to Samuel P. Fay (Oct. 8, 1805), in WILLIAM W. STORY, LIFE AND 
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 114 (1851); Dunne, supra note 43, at 718.  
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the first decades of the nineteenth century.54 The place of solitude was his 
island within his archipelago of republicanism. He did not need a literary 
artifact to remind him of this place. On June 22, 1805, Joseph Story 
gathered all the copies of The Power of Solitude he could locate and 
burned them in a fire.55 Did this conflagration destroy his desire for a place 
apart or did it consecrate solitude as his—solely possessed, unshared, 
particular, and exclusive? 
III. THIRD SONG: A REPUBLIC OF GEARS 
In November 1829, Story delivered a laudatory speech to the Boston 
Mechanics’ Society. It is not surprising that he was chosen as the speaker. 
Supreme Court Justices on circuit in the early nineteenth century, and 
especially Story, saw themselves as experts in the law of their region—
much as legislators represented local constituencies. As with admiralty 
law, Story staked out his expertise within the Court on patent law. Quite 
remarkably, Story wrote about forty patent opinions.56 Just as there was a 
republic of letters in early nineteenth-century America, so was there a 
republic of gears.   
The lecture sketched how Hamiltonian aims of establishing a 
commercial commonwealth might be obtained through levelling means. 
According to Story, the absence of hierarchy allows technical knowledge 
to flourish. The American Revolution swept away the class barriers to 
rewarding genius—hence the importance of the patent system. A republic 
opposes the “uniform tendency to reduce human beings to mere 
machines.”57 It provides free education and fosters a sense of 
experimentation. Story, who despite his patrician comportment came from 
a family of more modest origins, holds out the possibility of erasing class 
barriers to the advancement of the artisans in the audience. The 
advancement of new technologies under the “quickening power of science” 
will prompt a social revolution as striking as the political revolution that 
led to independence.58 
Story was trying very hard to lend legitimacy to the Boston 
Mechanics’ Institute. Such associations were a fairly new phenomenon. 
Founded by John Anderson and George Birkbeck, they emerged during the 
                                                                                                                     
54 See KEVIN BUTTERFIELD, THE MAKING OF TOCQUEVILLE’S AMERICA: LAW AND ASSOCIATION 
IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 25 (2015) (concluding that voluntary affiliation in organized groups was 
“embraced” in the nineteenth century and contributed to a “pervasive culture of constitutional 
self-government”). 
55 Dunne, supra note 43, at 717. 
56 NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 139. 
57 JOSEPH STORY, A Discourse Delivered Before the Boston Mechanics’ Institute, at the Opening 
of Their Annual Course of Lectures, November, 1829, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH 
STORY 475, 499 (William W. Story ed., 1852). 
58 Id. at 497. 
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first decades of the nineteenth century in Glasgow and London out of 
private lectures. Certainly, there was a similar practice of establishing 
learned societies for elites. But mechanics’ institutes depended upon 
inventors operating in a collaborative tradition with shared cultural 
practices. Machinists were deeply networked across such industries as iron 
foundries, locomotives, steam engines, textile production, and farm 
implements.59 This culture operated at many levels: the shop floor, regional 
level, and what Anthony F. C. Wallace called the “international fraternity 
of mechanicians.”60 
Urban crafts were once organized in deeply hierarchical fashion as 
guilds. Again, mechanics’ institutes reordered social relations. These trades 
societies generally had some sort of foundational document—a 
constitution61 or bylaws—and a commitment to “artisan republican”62 
values. It is particularly important for Story that the Mechanics’ Institute is 
a form of mutual education. The institutes in Philadelphia (the Franklin 
Institute), Boston, and New York sponsored public lectures, collected and 
displayed models of machinery, and created reading rooms. Doing so, they 
evaded a traditional hierarchical dissemination of knowledge. Many of the 
American mechanic societies, including the Boston Mechanics’ Institution 
(founded in 1827), the Maryland Institute, and the Franklin Institute, had 
provisions in their by-laws requiring that three-fourths of their directors be 
practical mechanics.63 The New York Mechanics’ Institute made the 
republican thrust of the association absolutely clear: without this 
independent education artisans “will be doomed to an intellectual and 
political slavery by the better educated classes.”64 
Most importantly, mechanics were at the heart of debates over patent 
in the New Republic. The first Patent Act (1790) designated a triumvirate 
of the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State to 
determine whether a patent should be granted.65 In some ways, this highly 
discretionary system was modeled on the monarchical privilege of granting 
patents in early modern England rather than the modern scheme of 
establishing legal rights when certain rigorous standards of inventiveness 
were met. An inventor himself, Jefferson, as Secretary of State, dominated 
                                                                                                                     
59 ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE, ROCKDALE: THE GROWTH OF AN AMERICAN VILLAGE IN THE 
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60 Id. at 211. 
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the process. There were complaints about favoritism and a sense that the 
broad discretion was abused. 
Less than a year into the operation of the 1790 Patent Act, Jefferson 
drafted a new statute.66 It eliminated the preliminary examination by the 
Patent Board composed of cabinet members. Instead, it relied upon a mix 
of public involvement and court intervention to determine whether an 
invention was worthy of a limited monopoly. The public was informed 
about the patent by an extensive notification requirement, obligating the 
publication of a brief description of the invention in newspapers. This 
description was to be published three times in every district. This proposed 
statute, which never was enacted, suggests an alternative mechanism to 
determine patentability: the patent holder would have to defend the validity 
of the patent in court. As a result, Jefferson hoped that courts would 
develop a sophisticated doctrine of patentability. In a certain sense, this 
was a turn towards common law jurisprudence with its reliance upon 
judicial opinions to set legal rules. Such increased litigation might pose a 
threat to unsuspecting makers or sellers of a patented object. Jefferson 
included a remarkably modern provision providing an innocent user 
defense immunizing a defendant in an infringement suit.67 
Support for such institutes was directly connected to Story’s 
contribution in patent law. Although during his initial two decades on the 
Supreme Court Story was not particularly favorable to patents, he 
increasingly came to see them as critical to the economic development of 
the country. Story promoted a liberal interpretation of patenting as a 
particularly United States phenomenon—in contrast to the British 
patenting system. “[I]t has always been the course of the American courts,” 
he wrote somewhat disingenuously—considering his earlier record, “to 
construe these patents fairly and liberally, and not to subject them to any 
over-nice and critical refinements.”68  
Indeed, in a number of cases, Story developed a theory of property 
rights in patents that made it difficult to revoke them and, in general, 
favored validity. Yet Story continued to insist on two fundamental 
principles. First, republican patents had to be bestowed as (I hesitate to use 
the phrase) a quid pro quo. “[M]onopoly is granted upon the express 
condition,” Story wrote, “that the party shall make a full and explicit 
disclosure, so as to enable the public, at the expiration of his patent, to 
make and use the invention . . . .”69 The Constitution recognizes the 
centrality of the public, Story argued, by declaring their object as 
                                                                                                                     
66 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Draft of a Bill to Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts, in 6 THE 
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67 Id. at 191. 
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“promot[ing] the progress of science and useful arts.”70 And, second—as 
he did with law, in general, and with equity—Story insisted that there was 
a science behind the patent grant. 
In this regard, Story sided with the mechanics against the 
Jeffersonians. A struggle over the control of inventive knowledge emerged 
in the early nineteenth century. A Philadelphia lawyer associated with the 
Franklin Institute, Peter Browne, requested information about patents in 
order to disseminate this information among mechanics. But William 
Thornton, the first superintendent of patents, resisted. In 1825, Browne 
succeeded in finally obtaining patent documents in order to publish 
descriptions in the Journal of the Franklin Institute. What is striking is that 
the mechanics’ institutes functioned as citizen patent offices. They held 
tribunals to determine the inventiveness of a new mechanical device, 
offered incentives—in the form of prizes for new inventions—published 
descriptions of innovative technology in their journals much like the Patent 
Office itself, and displayed models as might be found in Washington. 
Story’s lecture has to be read in this context. If there was a struggle 
between dilettante inventors like Jefferson, who relied simply on their 
discretion to determine the worthiness of the patent, and mechanic critics 
who deployed the laws of science, then Story clearly knew which of these 
better embodied republican principles.  
There are manifold ways to establish republics in a minor key—and 
Story deployed different strategies to fashion his own. Deploying admiralty 
law as a separate jurisdiction unleashed the possibilities of tempering 
common law with civil law, grounding norms on the firm principles of 
legal science, and keeping the seaward expanse of American commerce 
aloof from quarrelsome state and regional politics. Jurisdiction is 
topography. But it is a very special sort of topography: a geographic 
imaginaire constructed by courts as surely as mountains are produced by 
architectonic forces. Similarly, the romantic landscape of Story’s 
envisioned fortress of solitude was constructed as a refuge from personal 
trauma and, in his mind, the emergence of deep political party divisions 
with the Jeffersonian ascendancy. Story built a parallel world. It was 
populated with secluded groves, neoclassical ruins, gothic turrets, and the 
unobtainable objects of romantic longing. Built out of poetic couplets 
rather than legal precedent, it was no less a place—a republic of one’s 
own. But, since it was deeply personal, Story could consign his poem to 
the flames and still retain a private emotional refuge in an overwhelmingly 
public life.   
And the Republic of Gears was all that a judge could desire. It ran 
according to those who believed in a Newtonian world of natural laws, 
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embodied republican ideals of non-hierarchical association, and—through 
technological invention—might promote the progress of Story’s national 
vision of an America of artisans. This republic in a minor key required 
recognition as much as construction. An association of mechanics—
tinkerers dressed in leather aprons and with wire eyeglasses perched 
uneasily atop their heads—might well be said to be a republic in miniature.   
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF KENT NEWMYER 
I want to conclude with Kent—since this celebration is really all about 
his extraordinary life in teaching and scholarship. As I said at the 
beginning, Kent has become terribly relevant. He teaches the law of 
slavery at the Law School—a course that is an essential exploration of how 
law could be used to prop up evil. In the age of Michael Cohen, when 
lawyers are “an easy tool, [d]eferential, [and] glad to be of use,”71 this 
perhaps should be our required course in professional responsibility. 
As Mary Bilder pointed out, Kent published his book on the treason 
trial of Aaron Burr—getting the jump on Lin-Manuel Miranda’s 
Hamilton—with a bit less rap. “Pardon me, are you Aaron Burr, sir? . . . 
It’s a blur, sir . . . If you stand for nothing Burr, what’ll you fall for?”72 
Confused? Kent makes all these lyrics crystal clear.  
He decimated Chief Justice Roger Taney in a slim volume well before 
his statue was pulled down by protesters who will never forgive him for 
the Dred Scott decision.73 In his biography of Marshall, he reminds us how 
important it is to combine tactical savvy with principle if one seeks to 
defend the Court in a hostile political environment.74 Someone should mail 
a copy to our current Supreme Court Justices.  
And Story’s republicanism in a minor key might well be a way that we 
can survive our own dark times. Story’s songs might not be so different 
from the kind of snatches of melody that we will need as we grapple with 
the problem of the rule of law in a neo-Jacksonian age of instrumentalism.   
At first glance, Kent’s magisterial study of Story seems a 
contradiction: Nebraska cornfields meets New England Patrician 
magistrate. But there is an even more surprising side of Kent people in this 
room probably do not know. Kent has his own romantic object of 
                                                                                                                     
71 T. S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in POETRY: A MAGAZINE OF VERSE 135 
(Harriet Monroe ed., 1915). 
72 LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, Aaron Burr, Sir, on HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN MUSICAL (ORIGINAL 
BROADWAY CAST) (Atlantic Recording Co. 2015). 
73 See Steven Wilf, Qui sont les Romains dans Dred Scott?, in PENSÉE JURIDIQUE OCCIDENTALE 
ET JURISTES ROMAINS: ARCHÉOLOGIE D’UN HÉRITAGE (Pierre Bonin, Nader Hakim, Fara Nasti & Aldo 
Schiavone eds., forthcoming 2021).   
74 R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 413 
(2001). 
 
1298 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:4 
longing—much like Story in The Power of Solitude.75 He is in love with 
the contemporary Polish poetess, Wisława Szymborska. 
Kent does not claim to write about our own age. His depiction of 
Story’s Early Republic never resembles a mélange of costume drama and 
political morality play. Observing the professional norms of historians, he 
remains circumspect about how history might inform current affairs. But 
Kent’s approach might be too modest for dark times. Story—and Kent—
are remarkably germane when we wrestle with rule of law’s possible 
contours. As Szymborska tells us, “When I pronounce the word Future, the 
first syllable already belongs to the past.”76 
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